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TAX SALIENCE: AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION 
 
Andrea Morone1 and Francesco Nemore2 
Abstract 
A basic principle in public finance is tax incidence equivalence (well known as Liability Side Equivalence Principle, LES). This 
principle holds that the burden of a unit tax on buyers and sellers is independent of who actually pays the tax. Moreover, economic 
theory assumes an individual behaviour model in which subjects act as if they have to fully optimize changes in tax policies by 
correctly processing information in their possession. However, a wide empirical literature focused on some psychological issues that 
have as yet not been considered theoretically. It is easy to assume that the introduction of tax-inclusive prices and tax-exclusive 
prices could lead to price misperception. This means that individuals could not perceive the exact burden of a tax when it is not 
salient (as it could be in the case of tax-exclusive prices). We conduct a laboratory experiment that attempts to answer two relevant 
questions: (1) Do subjects’ behaviour change with a less salient tax? (2) Is tax incidence independent of the responsibility to pay a 
more or less salient tax? Based on the results of Mann-Whitney U tests, concerning the first question we conclude that, in 
accordance to the theory of tax incidence, subjects’ behaviour is not affected by salience. On the other hand, concerning the second 
question, contrary to theoretical predictions, we report evidence of stark differences in average trading prices for LSE principle 
analysis. Most notably, we observe that tax-on-seller treatment prices are systematically higher, thus revealing a plausible tax-
shifting phenomenon. 
Keywords: Tax incidence, Tax salience, Liability Side Equivalence, choice behaviour, laboratory.  
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1. Introduction 
Tax incidence is one of the most fundamental questions in public economics, since it implicates the 
economic burden of a tax. A basic principle in public finance is tax incidence equivalence (well known as 
Liability-Side Equivalence Principle, LES). This principle holds that the burden of a unit tax on buyers 
and sellers is independent of who actually pays the tax. In the Handbook of Public Economics, Fullerton 
and Metcalf (2002) distinguish between “economic incidence” and “statutory incidence”: that is the 
person who had to pay tax legally may not be the person who bears the real tax burden. Thus the 
economic incidence of a tax is independent of the statutory incidence. Instead, the relative tax burden 
depends solely on the relative elasticity of supply and demand. Moreover, economic theory assumes an 
individual behaviour model in which subjects act as if they have to fully optimize changes in tax policies 
by correctly processing information in their possession. Substantially, subjects’ behaviours will not be 
affected by the external environment or the manner in which decisions are made. According to some 
authors, this theory has shown a number of limitations over the years, especially in practice. Interestingly, 
DellaVigna (2007) detects empirically how individuals systematically deviate from the behaviour 
assumed by the standard theory in three classes of preference: nonstandard preferences, nonstandard 
beliefs and nonstandard decision making. A theory that seems to contradict economic postulates is the 
theory of “price presentation” (Biswas et al., 1993, Krishna et al., 2002). This theory has always been at 
the centre of marketing policies: the objective was to present prices in order to minimize the perceived 
burden of all expenses. It is based on the assumption that subject behaviour deviates systematically than 
preached by the standard economic theory. This would predict that subject response to equivalent price 
cuts should not depend on how the price cut is presented (price framing). With “price framing” the 
authors broadly mean how the offer price is communicated to the subject, for example, is the offered price 
given along with a reference price? Is the reference price plausible? Is a price deal communicated in 
dollars or percentage terms? Besides the actual price, how the price offering is presented to subjects also 
affects individual evaluation of the product offering as well as the purchase decision. There is a wide 
empirical evidence indicating that the “price framing” effect is a ubiquitous phenomenon documented in 
many fields of investigation such as medical and clinical decisions, perceptual judgments, responses to 
social dilemmas, bargaining behaviours, auditing evaluations (Levin et al., 1998). On the basis of such 
evidence, it is easy to assume that the introduction of tax-inclusive prices and tax-exclusive prices could 
lead to price misperception. This means that individuals could not perceive the exact burden of a tax 
when it is not salient (as it could be in the case of tax-exclusive prices). Where the theoretical literature is 
mainly based on the fact that the individual perceives the exact tax burden, as discussed below, some 
research has disproved this assumption revealing even, in some cases, large differences between the 
personal estimates and the actual amount of the tax burden3. Some psychological features seem to emerge 
in tax incidence empirical literature. Part of the literature examined whether individuals perceive the 
marginal income tax rate correctly (see Gensemer et al., 1965; Morgan et al., 1977; Fuji and Hawley, 
1988; Rupert and Fisher, 1995). Results appear to be inconsistent, because in some surveys the marginal 
tax rate is underestimated while in others it is overestimated. In contrast, Rosen (1976) showed that white 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 We can define the “perceived tax burden” as the tax burden that an individual estimates explicitly when he is called upon to make 
an economic decision, e.g. on labor supply, asset allocation, voting in elections. 
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married women react to tax rate modification rationally4, revealing a limited “tax illusion”5. Another 
strand of literature investigates subjects’ misperceptions in evaluating complex tax frameworks. In 
general, there is some vulnerability in contributors’ understanding of tax systems due to their extreme 
complexity (McCaffery and Baron, 2006). Some experiments show that a correct perception of tax effects 
can be realized only by establishing a simple tax framework. In Boylan and Frishmann (2006) and Rupert 
et al. (2003) experiments, subjects trade fictitious goods, of which the gains are taxed. In each treatment 
the form of tax scale presentation is changed to gauge the “framing effect”. Substantially, they note that 
higher tax complexity rules lead to misperceptions, and consequently a worse judgment and decision 
outcome. In many cases, an individual’s decision making process relies on a heuristic approach, in which 
they choose to focus on salient objects by ignoring the most relevant information. This is contrary to the 
economic theory assumptions: individuals act according to full rationality. The field of cognitive 
psychology, with important roots in Herbert Simon’s “bounded rationality” (1955), has shown how 
individuals deviate, often systematically, from ideal perceptions of rationality including consistency6. For 
example, de Bartolome (1995) finds that many individuals use the average rate as if it were the marginal 
tax rate in making economic decisions7. Other studies give attention to the LES Principle. Also in this 
case results seem to be different depending on the experimental design. The main finding is that the 
equivalence relation on the base of the LSE can only be achieved when subjects register a learning effect 
due to a sufficient number of trading periods. Kerschbamer and Kirchsteiger (2000) resort to an 
ultimatum game in which the proposer or the respondent assumes liability to pay the tax. In the absence 
of a learning effect that leads to equivalent pricing in the experimental treatments, they reject the LSE 
assumption. Furthermore, Sausgruber and Tyran (2005) investigate whether an incorrect tax perception 
can translate into distorted fiscal choices by using a referendum mechanism8. They show that if 
individuals have the opportunity to learn, they can properly assess their tax burden correctly. Similarly, 
Ruffle (2005) conducts an experiment in which participants are led to exchange a good in a pit market9. 
This analysis involves a tax or a subsidy implementation either on buyers or on sellers after some tax free 
periods. They show that, in general, the price variance decreases over several periods, thus confirming the 
LSE principle.   
We conduct a laboratory experiment that attempts to answer two relevant research questions: (1) Do 
subjects’ behaviour change with a less salient tax? (2) Is tax incidence independent of the responsibility to 
pay a more or less salient tax? Laboratory experiments are particularly well suited to the purpose at hand. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 In fact, Rosen shows that the cross-sectional correlation between marginal tax rate and work hours and wage rates and work hours 
is similar. 
5 The so-called phenomenon of “fiscal illusion” generally suggests that when government revenues are not completely transparent or 
are not fully perceived by taxpayers, the cost of government is seen to be less expensive than it actually is. Since some, or all, 
taxpayers benefit from government expenditures from these unobserved or hidden revenues, the public’s appetite for government 
expenditures increases, thus providing politicians incentive to expand the size of government. In this case, “fiscal illusion” arises 
when the relative invisibility of indirect taxes is compared to more visible direct taxes. Tax payers may systematically underestimate 
the tax burden from indirect taxes as compared to direct taxes, because indirect taxes are incorporated into the price of goods. 
6 He proposed a model in which individuals face a cost of processing information and therefore rationally use simplifying heuristics 
to solve complex problems. As reported by Simon, assuming the psychological limits in computational and predictive ability, “the 
actual human rationality can at best be an extremely crude and simplified approximation to the kind of global rationality that is 
implied, for example, by game-theoretical models”. In this way, it is possible that people make predictable mistakes in thinking 
about tax and public finance, areas of considerable complexity. 
7 Particularly, in a laboratory experiment, the author shows that many MBA students confuse the average rate with the marginal rate 
when they have to invest 1$ in a taxable or non-taxable project.  
8 Subjects can earn income from trade activities and are then given the opportunity to express a vote on a proposal to tax market 
transactions with a direct tax or indirect tax respectively in two experimental treatments.  
9 A “pit market” can be defined as a market in which trade activities among participants are not conducted anonymously.  That is to 
say that every person is free to choose his business partner who does not remain anonymous during the negotiation. 
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They are performed in a controlled environment in which it is possible to avoid many econometric 
problems of observational data analysis. In this way we can be assured that resulting experimental data 
cannot be useless or misleading in testing theory assumptions. We design a laboratory experiment with 
between-subject variations, in which subjects trade a fictitious good in a double-auction market as 
pioneered by Smith (1962). We compare ST (Salient Tax) with NST (Non-Salient Tax) treatments to 
answer our first research question and then tax-on-buyer with tax-on-seller treatments to answer our 
second research question. The remainder of this work is organized as follows. The next section describes 
two prominent works strictly close to our research questions, whereas the subsequent sections present our 
experimental design in detail (section 3), and discuss our findings (section 4). Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Related experiments 
Chetty et al. (2009) define the salience of a tax as “the simplicity of calculating the gross-of-tax price of a 
good”10. Tax salience and the implication of tax perception was firstly recognised by John Stuart Mill 
(1848), who stated that: 
“Perhaps […] the money which [the taxpayer] is required to pay directly out of his pocket is the only 
taxation which he is quite sure that he pays at all. […]. If all taxes were direct, taxation would be much 
more perceived than at present; and there would be a security which now there is not, for economy in the 
public expenditure.” 
On the basis of Mill’s intuition that stated the lower salience of an indirect tax, Chetty et al. (2009) 
demonstrate how individuals in their purchasing activities are not aware of the tax burden imposed. They 
conduct a field experiment in a grocery store where they published the tax-inclusive price for 750 
products subject to sales tax. Normally, in this store, prices posted on the shelf exclude sales tax of 
7.375%. If the good is subject to sales tax (cosmetics, hair care accessories and deodorants), it is added to 
the bill only at the cashier. After showing the tax-inclusive price below the original pre-tax price tag for a 
three week period, the register data analysis revealed that this led to a reduction in demand for these 
products by 8% compared to the two controlled groups of other similar items in the same aisle (with only 
tax-exclusive prices) of the treatment store and items in two other stores of the same chain located in 
nearby cities11. They therefore conclude that the tax is totally ignored until the moment the subject 
reaches the cashier to make the payment. In fact, by showing prices with tax and without tax, the 
consumer is provoked into properly assessing the total price of the product (tax inclusive). This clearly 
indicates that indirect taxes that are only applied at the checkout are less salient. However, the authors 
proceed to a second empirical investigation to verify whether these findings are confirmed by the 
observational data on alcohol consumption between 1970 and 2003. In the United States, alcohol is 
subject to a double taxation with excise tax included in the posted price and ad valorem tax that is added 
at checkout. The increase of either should theoretically lead to the same behavioural responses. An 
analysis of the elasticity of demand for alcohol in the long run actually reveals how the salience matters: 
the increases in excise tax reduces alcohol consumption more than ad valorem tax decreases it. In order to 
confirm this important evidence, the authors conduct an interview with customers entering the store to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 More precisely, we can say that tax policy A is more salient than tax policy B, if the calculation of the gross-of-tax price of the 
first fiscal policy is less complex than that for the gross-of-tax of the second policy (Chetty et al., 2009). 
11 The treatment effect of publishing tax-inclusive prices is statistically significant using both t-tests and other nonparametric tests. 
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check if they know what goods are subject to ad valorem tax. As the average individual responded 
correctly to 7 out of 8 products investigated and declared an average tax rate of within 0.5 percentage 
points of the true rate, the authors concluded that subjects chose not to calculate the tax-inclusive price 
when making their purchases, thus confirming salience magnitude.  
We know that a fundamental preposition in tax incidence theory is the independence of the assignment of 
the liability to pay tax over a long-term analysis of competitive markets: a fundamental principle 
according to which a general equilibrium tax incidence equivalence implies that the incidence is 
independent of which side of the market is levied. Therefore assigning legal liability to pay tax should not 
affect tax incidence in the long run. Another key issue in economic literature is the potential influence of 
the type of market institution on tax incidence. Effectively, there are many different types of markets, 
each of which has different properties and mechanisms for determining the price and the quantity traded 
between sellers and buyers. It is plausible that different market configurations lead to different incidence 
results. This insight is the basis of the work conducted by Cox et al. (2012). Their paper research 
questions are essentially two: (A) Is tax incidence independent of the assignment of the liability to pay tax 
in experimental markets? (B) Is tax incidence independent of the market institution in experimental 
markets? In a laboratory experiment the authors compare two different market institutions: a double-
auction market (DA) and a posted-offer market (PO)12. The experimental design was specifically 
designed to test whether the change of market institution or the assignment of the liability to pay tax may 
cause different results in terms of incidence. The first hypothesis tested is the technical prediction 
regarding the influence of market institutions on tax incidence. For this reason, the authors propose 
changing the market institution from DA to PO, maintaining the same condition of liability to pay tax. 
Subsequently, they change the assignment of liability to pay tax from the seller to the buyer, keeping the 
market institution the same. In this way, the experimental design is composed of four treatments: 
1. A double-auction market with a unit tax on the buyer (DATB); 
2. A double-auction market with a unit tax on the seller (DATS); 
3. A posted-offer market with a unit tax on the buyer (POTB); 
4. A posted-offer market with a unit tax on the seller (POTS). 
In each treatment subjects were randomly divided between buyers and sellers. Each treatment consists of 
four independent markets, in turn composed of 5 buyers and 5 sellers who trade simultaneously. The 
subjects are asked to perform 5 trading periods of practice to help them become familiar with the 
software. Subsequently, there are 30 periods of real exchange for each treatment. At the beginning of each 
trading period, each buyer or seller gets 5 infra-marginal units of a fictitious good to buy or sell. The 
experimental design follows that of Smith (1962, 1982) very closely. The assignment of liability to pay 
tax and the amount of the unit tax (12 ED13) are announced to the subjects at the beginning of the 
treatments. To ensure simplicity, costs, values and unit tax remain the same throughout the experiment. 
The theory of tax incidence says that there should be no difference between the average prices of the 
buyer in, both, the DA and PO treatments. The comparison between the CDFs of average buyer prices 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 In experimental double-auction markets buyers and sellers are free to declare a price quote for one unit of the fictitious 
commodity within certain time constraints. Each exchange covers a single unit of commodity and is realized when one of the parties 
accepts the price quote proposed by the other party. In posted-offer markets the seller publishes the prices of goods possibly limiting 
the amount for sale and the buyer decides to buy this good on the basis of a comparison between the prices published by different 
sellers. 
13 Experimental Dollars 
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from DATB and DATS treatment and from POTB and POTS treatment lead the authors to reject the 
hypothesis that tax incidence is independent of the assignment of liability to pay. Also the comparison 
between the two CDFs of the average buyer prices from DATB and POTB treatments and from DATS 
and POTS treatments lead to rejecting the hypothesis that tax incidence is independent of the market 
institution14. All these findings are incompatible with standard theoretical predictions. Moreover, the PO 
treatments have produced an equilibrium quantity of 10 units compared to 15 units predicted by the 
theory. This highlights the possible tax over-shifting. This is more likely to occur in PO markets as 
confirmed by a number of studies (see for instance Ashenfelter and Sullivan, 1987; Harris, 1987; Keeler 
at al., 1996; Hanson and Sullivan, 2009). 
 
3. Experimental design 
3.1 An overview 
We conduct a laboratory experiment with a between-subjects design in which subjects trade one unit of a 
fictitious good in a double-auction market. The experiment15 was programmed and conducted with the 
software z-Tree (Fishbacher, 2007). The experimental design consists of nine treatments performed in the 
following order (see Table 1): 
 
Table 1: Summary of Experimental Treatments 
#treatment Treatment Tag Treatment Description 
1 NT No Tax treatment 
2 STB4 Salient Tax on Buyer (4 ECU) 
3 STS4 Salient Tax on Seller (4 ECU) 
4 STB8 Salient Tax on Buyer (8 ECU) 
5 STS8 Salient Tax on Seller (8 ECU) 
6 NSTB4 Non-salient Tax on Buyer (4 ECU) 
7 NSTS4 Non-salient Tax on Seller (4 ECU) 
8 NSTB8 Non-salient Tax on Buyer (8 ECU) 
9 NSTS8 Non-salient Tax on Seller (8 ECU) 
 
1. A treatment in which subjects face an induced stationary demand and supply schedule16 with no 
tax imposition (NT); 
2. A treatment with subjects facing a demand schedule with reserve prices that are implicitly 
reduced by the amount of a 4 ECU excise tax on buyers (STB4); 
3. A treatment with subjects facing a supply schedule with cost values that are implicitly 
incremented by the amount of a 4 ECU excise tax on sellers (STS4); 
4. A treatment with subjects facing a demand schedule with reserve prices that are implicitly 
reduced by the amount of an 8 ECU excise tax on buyers (STB8); 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Particularly, the change in market institution has a greater impact on tax incidence than a change in the assignment of the liability. 
15 Figure 1A in the appendix depicts a screenshot of the experimental market place for a seller in the treatment with no tax 
imposition.	  
16 All treatments in each session refer to supply and demand schedules of no tax treatment (first treatment) although they are suitably 
modified in ST treatments to ensure theoretical equivalence conditions with NST treatments. 
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5. A treatment with subjects facing a supply schedule with cost values that are implicitly 
incremented by the amount of an 8 ECU excise tax on sellers (STS8); 
6. A treatment in which subjects face the no tax treatment schedules with the explicit imposition of 
a 4 ECU excise tax on buyers (NSTB4); 
7. A treatment in which subjects face the no tax treatment schedules with the explicit imposition of 
a 4 ECU excise tax on sellers (NSTS4); 
8. A treatment in which subjects face the no tax treatment schedules with the explicit imposition of 
an 8 ECU excise tax on buyers (NSTB8); 
9. A treatment in which subjects face the no tax treatment schedules with the explicit imposition of 
an 8 ECU excise tax on sellers (NSTS8). 
Particularly, in ST treatments it is assumed that showing a price or a cost value incorporating the excise 
tax makes it more perceptible and therefore more salient. However, in NST treatments, values do not 
include tax, and consumers face a cognitive cost of computing the actual price or cost in the presence of a 
lower tax salience. The definition of two different amounts of the excise tax (4 and 8 ECU) will allow us 
to determine whether a higher tax may lead to different effects on traders’ behaviour ceteris paribus. In 
this way, we can be assured that ST treatments will have the same parameterizations of NST treatments 
and will be comparable from a theoretical standpoint. In fact, the translation of supply and demand 
schedules due to explicit tax imposition in NST treatments will lead to equivalence with ST treatment 
schedules. Clearly, the ST treatments can accurately represent situations in which the “in-front-of-the-
shelf” consumer is shown the tax-inclusive price. Conversely, NST treatments represent situations in 
which the consumer is shown the tax-exclusive price. In this case, as frequently happens, the tax will be 
added (and hence it will be more salient) only at the checkout.  
The experiment was conducted in the “Lee” Laboratory for economic research at the University “Jaume 
I” of Castellón (Spain). Participants were 138 undergraduate students, particularly freshmen. We ran six 
sessions over some regular days in September 2014. Each session consisted of the nine treatments 
reported above and lasted about 100 minutes. The subjects’ role as well as costs and values were 
randomly assigned at the beginning of each treatment and were the same throughout the entire treatment, 
but they differed across treatments. At first, subjects were given a hard copy of the instructions. Subjects 
were allowed to ask questions either publically or privately to clarify any doubts. Trading activities were 
performed by adopting Experimental Currency Units (ECU) as the currency during the experiment. At the 
end of each session, subjects are paid their cumulative earnings according to the conversion rate 10 
ECU=1€. 
 
3.2 Session description 
In each session buyers and sellers trade the good in a double-auction market that is opened for 90 seconds 
in each trading period. The trading screen of all participants always displays the lower “ask” and the 
higher “bid”. The contract is concluded only if a seller accepts the standing “bid” or a buyer accepts the 
standing “ask”. Traders are sited in a manner that protects their privacy, and are not allowed to 
communicate with each other. This procedure is identical for all treatments. Each session includes 9 
treatments. In each treatment both buyers and sellers have 1 unit of a fictitious good to trade. All subjects 
first trade in 2 practice periods and then in 7 relevant periods in a given treatment. We induced different 
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demand and supply curves for each market. The demand and supply schedule remain fixed across periods 
in a given treatment, but they differ among treatments to gauge tax salience impact. In the first treatment, 
subjects trade with the stationary demand and supply schedule in the absence of tax (NT) as shown in 
Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Demand and Supply schedule in NT treatment (Session1) 
 
 
The predicted equilibrium occurs where the curves intersect the quantity equal to 11, and the price 
between 44 and 46 (we assumed 45 as the equilibrium price for surplus calculus). As mentioned above, in 
the following four treatments (ST treatments), the amount of the excise tax has been deducted from values 
or added to costs, depending on the legal responsibility to pay. In the second treatment the demand 
schedule is shifted by 4 ECU compared to the previous setting. This means that the tax is imposed on the 
buyer and values have been adjusted for the respective tax amount.  In this case the equilibrium occurs 
with a quantity equal to 10 and a price equal to 43 ECU (see Figure 1A in the appendix). In terms of 
incidence, the third treatment is theoretically equivalent to the previous treatment (see Figure 1B in the 
appendix). The supply schedule is shifted by 4 ECU because the tax is paid by the sellers. The 
equilibrium occurs with a quantity equal to 10 and a price equal to 47 ECU. The introduction of an 8 ECU 
excise tax determines an equilibrium quantity equal to 9 for both treatments and an equilibrium price 
equal to 41 ECU for the fourth treatment and 49 ECU for the fifth treatment. The supply and demand 
schedules relating to these treatments are shown respectively in Figures 1C and 1D. 
In contrast, NST treatments always resort to no-tax treatment demand and supply schedules. We know 
from theory that the imposition of an excise tax will shift schedules to the exact tax amount, as subjects 
must necessarily consider taxes in their personal assessment. In particular, if the tax is imposed on the 
buyer, the maximum that he is willing to pay will be equal to the sum of the good’s price and the tax. 
Likewise, if the tax is imposed on the seller, the tax will be considered as an additional cost to those 
already incurred in the production and/or sale activities. This implies for example that if the buyer is 
aware of the application of an excise tax, then rationally he should consider paying the tax in the 
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maximum assigned value resulting in a downward shift of its demand curve. On the other hand, in the 
presence of perfect rationality, the seller will consider the tax as an additional cost that will raise its 
supply curve. In this way, ST and NST treatments are theoretically equivalent and allow proper 
assessment of the effects of greater or lesser tax salience. More precisely, the second treatment will be 
equivalent to the sixth treatment, the third treatment will be equivalent to the seventh treatment, the fourth 
treatment will be equivalent to the eighth treatment and the fifth treatment will be equivalent to the ninth 
treatment. In the appendix, we list all theoretical and experimental values of price, quantity, total surplus, 
as well as buyers’ and sellers’ surplus in reference to the first session setting (see Table 2-13). 
 
4. Experiment results 
4.1 Markets efficiency analysis 
An initial data analysis is intended to ascertain whether the subjects’ surplus reflects theoretical 
prediction. Theoretically, as we have already seen, the equivalence relations on the basis of ST and NST 
treatments requires that all buyers and sellers shall equally share profits from trading activities. Clearly, 
the design setting described above requires a different calculation of the surplus for different treatments. 
As in the first treatment and in the following four treatments, subjects face tax-inclusive values (more 
salient tax), therefore the surplus is equal to 𝑆! = 𝑣 − 𝑝 
for buyers and 𝑆! = 𝑝 − 𝑐 
for sellers, where 𝑆! and 𝑆! are buyers’ and sellers’ surpluses, respectively, 𝑣 denotes private values, 𝑝 is 
the unit price and 𝑐 is the marginal cost. In NST treatments, subjects face tax-exclusive values and have 
to support a cognitive cost of calculating the actual price or cost. In these cases, buyers’ surplus will be 
 𝑆! = 𝑣 − 𝑝 + 𝜏  
 
and sellers’ surplus will be 
 𝑆! = 𝑝 − 𝑐 + 𝜏  
 
where 𝜏 denotes the unit tax. To provide an insight into market collective efficiency, we use the 
coefficient of allocative efficiency introduced by Gode and Sunder (1997). This is a measure of 
performance of an entire market. It is given in the following equation and it is defined as the ratio of total 
actual profit and theoretical profit. Total actual profit is the sum of profits made by each trader while the 
theoretical profit is the sum of buyers’, 𝑠!, and sellers’, 𝑠!, surplus. 
 𝑒 = 𝑝𝑟!!∈!"#$%"&𝑠! + 𝑠! ×100 
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where 𝑝𝑟! is the profit of trader 𝑖, which is all his successful transactions. An analysis of allocative 
efficiency values distribution per treatment can be useful to gauge a “salience” effect. Figure 2 presents a 
boxplot indicating the comparison between treatments. 
 
Figure 2: Allocative efficiency coefficients distributions 
 
 
The distributions do not exhibit significant differences17 in achieving allocative efficiency among ST and 
NST treatments. However, it may be useful to separate the allocative efficiency coefficient in two 
components: buyers’ allocative efficiency and sellers’ allocative efficiency. They are measured as the 
ratio between the actual surplus realized in trading activities and the theoretical surplus (equal to 50% of 
the market total surplus).  
 
Figure 3: Buyers’ allocative efficiency coefficients distributions 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 A Mann-Whitney test rejects the null hypothesis at a 1% significance level.  
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An examination of the buyers’ coefficients distribution from the first comparison (STB4 vs. NSTB4) 
verifies a certain similarity between treatments18. However, a significant difference between STB8 and 
NSTB8 treatments can be seen where it seems that a greater excise amount (8 ECU) brings about a 
“salience” effect (see Figure 3). 
 
Figure 4: Sellers’ allocative efficiency coefficients distributions 
 
 
4.2 Prices breakdown 
To give insight into market convergence to equilibrium prices among control and treatment groups, we 
computed the coefficient of convergence 𝛼, introduced by Smith (1962), for each trading period. It 
measures how close a group of traders trade to the theoretical equilibrium. It is defined as the standard 
deviation of the actual trade price 𝑝 from the equilibrium price 𝑝! as a percentage of it.  
 
𝛼 = 100𝑝! 1𝑛 (𝑝!!!!! − 𝑝!) 
 
Hence 𝛼 provides a measure of exchange price variation relative to the predicted equilibrium exchange 
price. This means that the smaller the 𝛼 the greater will be the convergence to the market equilibrium 
price.  
As is seen in Figure 5, 𝛼 tends to increase marginally in NST treatments and to present a greater 
variability than ST treatments. It would seem that treatments with lower tax salience present a lower 
convergence to equilibrium. However, distributions are roughly similar and no significantly extreme 
differences are detected (except for the first comparison). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 A Mann-Whitney test rejects the null hypothesis at a 1% significance level.  
12 
	  
Figure 5: Coefficient of convergence distributions 
 
 
Our first research question was “Do subjects’ behaviours change with a less salient tax?” We make 
comparisons of the average trading price distributions from the eight relevant treatments (STB4 vs. 
NSTB4, STS4 vs. NSTS4, STB8 vs. NSTB8, STS8 vs. NSTS8). According to the theory of tax incidence, 
there should be no difference between the average trading prices in ST treatment compared to NST 
treatments. Figure 6 clearly depicts how the distributions of average trading prices from ST and NST 
treatments are very similar to each other. Although the imposition of an 8 ECU excise tax on sellers 
seems to determine different subjects’ behaviours with prices notably higher in the treatment with a lower 
tax salience. 
 
Figure 6: Average trading price distributions for salience assessment 
 
 
To confirm these results we use the Mann-Whitney U test for two independent samples. Comparing STB4 
vs. NSTB4, STS4 vs. NSTS4, STB8 vs. NSTB8 we cannot reject the null hypothesis of equality of 
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distributions19. However, by comparing STS8 vs. NSTS8, the two distributions are statistically different at 
any significance level, in this case we can reject the null hypothesis of equality of distributions. 
Summarizing these results, we can confirm that theoretical predictions hold valid in our laboratory 
experiment. We do not detect any significant difference between trading price distributions in ST and 
NST treatments, although we found a systematic price increase in the latter. 
Our second research question was “Is tax incidence independent of the responsibility to pay a more or less 
salient tax?” We make comparisons of the average trading price distributions from the eight relevant 
treatments (STB4 vs. STS4, STB8 vs. STS8, NSTB4 vs. NSTS4, NSTB8 vs. NSTS8) to test liability-side 
equivalence principle. This is a fundamental issue that can be considered as a main principle of public 
finance: a general equilibrium tax equivalence implying that the tax incidence is independent of which 
side of the market is levied. In other words, the price paid by the buyers will be the same no matter 
whether the buyers or the sellers have to pay the tax; similarly the price that the sellers receive (which 
equals the price that buyers pay minus the tax amount) will be the same independent of who pays the tax. 
Therefore, according to the theory of tax incidence, there should be no difference between the average 
trading prices in tax-on-buyers and tax-on-sellers treatments. Contrary to theoretical predictions, Figure 7 
clearly shows how distributions of average trading price from tax-on-buyers, and tax-on-sellers treatments 
are always different to each other. 
Figure 7: Average trading price distributions for LSE principle assessment 
 
Additionally, in this case, we used the Mann-Whitney test to confirm such relevant findings. By 
comparison of STB4 vs. STS4, STB8 vs. STS8, NSTB4 vs. NSTS4, and NSTB8 vs. NSTS8 the test fully 
confirms the conclusions discussed above. The average trading price distributions are significantly 
different, at any statistical significance level; indeed the trading prices in the case of a tax on sellers are 
higher than those in the case of a tax on buyers. Distributions are always statistically different to each 
other. As in Cox (2012), these results seem to confirm that the assignment of liability to pay taxes in 
competitive markets can produce a statistically significant effect in terms of tax incidence: taxes can be 
easily shifted to buyers when the obligation of liability to pay is on the seller. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 One-tailed p-values are 0.469, 0.180, and 0.256 respectively. 
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5. Conclusion 
We analysed data generated in an economic laboratory experiment and addressed two questions regarding 
tax salience: (1) Do subjects’ behaviours change with a less salient tax? (2) Is tax incidence independent 
of the responsibility to pay a more or less salient tax?  
To provide insight into experimental markets collective efficiency, we first computed an allocative 
efficiency coefficient for each period in each treatment. We found that coefficient distributions were very 
similar and there were no relevant differences in achieving allocative efficiency among ST and NST 
treatments. We proceeded to split the allocative efficiency coefficient into its two components: buyers’ 
and sellers’ allocative efficiency. We still found a certain resemblance between higher and lower salience 
treatments except for STB8-NSTB8 comparison.  
A first price analysis was conducted by calculating Smith’s coefficient of convergence for each period in 
each treatment. We noted that a lower salience treatment resulted in a slower convergence to market 
equilibrium, although convergence coefficient distributions appeared no different from each other. To 
answer our first research question we used the Mann-Whitney U test for two independent samples in 
order to examine statistical differences in average trading price distributions between ST and NST 
treatments. According to the theory of tax incidence, we detected no significant difference except for 
STS8-NSTS8 comparison. This difference could be explained by relevant cognitive effort in computing 
actual costs when sellers have to face a higher tax amount (8 ECU). However, we do not have additional 
data confirming our assessments, so it would be interesting to conduct further experiments in this 
direction. 
To test Liability Side Equivalence Principle (LSE) we used the Mann-Whitney U test to verify statistical 
significance differences between tax-on-buyer and tax-on-seller treatments. Contrary to theoretical 
predictions, we report evidence of stark differences in average trading prices. In particular, we observed 
that prices are systematically higher in tax-on-sellers treatments, thus revealing a plausible tax shifting 
phenomenon in, both, ST and NST treatments. 
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Appendix 
Figure 1A: Screenshot of the experimental market place for a seller in the treatment NT 
 
 
Figure 1A: Demand and Supply schedule in STB4 treatment  
 
Figure 1B: Demand and Supply schedule in STS4 treatment (Session 1) 
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Figure 1C: Demand and Supply schedule in STB8 treatment (Session 1) 
 
 
Figure 1D: Demand and Supply schedule in STS8 treatment (Session 1) 
0	  
10	  
20	  
30	  
40	  
50	  
60	  
70	  
80	  
0	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	   8	   9	   10	   11	   12	   13	   14	   15	  
Pr
ic
e	  
Quan+ty	  
0	  
10	  
20	  
30	  
40	  
50	  
60	  
70	  
80	  
0	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	   8	   9	   10	   11	   12	   13	   14	   15	  
Pr
ic
e	  
Quan+ty	  
19 
	  
 
 
Table 2: Theoretical values from Session 1 
Theoretical	  Values	  
Treatment	  
Equilibrium	  
Price	  
Equilibrium	  
Quantity	  
Equilibrium	  
Surplus	  
Buyers'	  
Surplus	  
Sellers'	  
Surplus	  
Buyers'	  
Surplus	  (%)	  
Sellers'	  
Surplus	  (%)	  
1	   45	   11	   242	   121	   121	   50	   50	  
2	   43	   10	   200	   100	   100	   50	   50	  
3	   47	   10	   200	   100	   100	   50	   50	  
4	   41	   9	   162	   81	   81	   50	   50	  
5	   49	   9	   162	   81	   81	   50	   50	  
6	   43	   10	   200	   100	   100	   50	   50	  
7	   47	   10	   200	   100	   100	   50	   50	  
8	   41	   9	   162	   81	   81	   50	   50	  
9	   49	   9	   162	   81	   81	   50	   50	  
 
Table 3: Theoretical values from Session 2 
Treatment	  
Theoretical	  Values	  
Equilibrium	  
Price	  	  
Equilibrium	  
Quantity	  
Equilibrium	  
Surplus	  
Buyers'	  
Surplus	  
Sellers'	  
Surplus	  
Buyers'	  
Surplus	  (%)	  
Sellers'	  
Surplus	  (%)	  
1	   45	   8	   128	   64	   64	   50	   50	  
2	   43	   7	   98	   49	   49	   50	   50	  
3	   47	   7	   98	   49	   49	   50	   50	  
4	   49	   6	   72	   36	   36	   50	   50	  
5	   41	   6	   72	   36	   36	   50	   50	  
6	   43	   7	   98	   49	   49	   50	   50	  
7	   47	   7	   98	   49	   49	   50	   50	  
8	   49	   6	   72	   36	   36	   50	   50	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9	   41	   6	   72	   36	   36	   50	   50	  
 
Table 4: Theoretical values from Session 3 
Treatment	  
Theoretical	  Values	  
Equilibrium	  
Price	  	  
Equilibrium	  
Quantity	  
Equilibrium	  
Surplus	  
Buyers'	  
Surplus	  
Sellers'	  
Surplus	  
Buyers'	  
Surplus	  (%)	  
Sellers'	  
Surplus	  (%)	  
1	   45	   8	   128	   64	   64	   50	   50	  
2	   43	   7	   98	   49	   49	   50	   50	  
3	   47	   7	   98	   49	   49	   50	   50	  
4	   41	   6	   72	   36	   36	   50	   50	  
5	   49	   6	   72	   36	   36	   50	   50	  
6	   43	   7	   98	   49	   49	   50	   50	  
7	   47	   7	   98	   49	   49	   50	   50	  
8	   41	   6	   72	   36	   36	   50	   50	  
9	   49	   6	   72	   36	   36	   50	   50	  
 
Table 5: Theoretical values from Session 4 
Treatment	  
Theoretical	  Values	  
Equilibrium	  
Price	  	  
Equilibrium	  
Quantity	  
Equilibrium	  
Surplus	  
Buyers'	  
Surplus	  
Sellers'	  
Surplus	  
Buyers'	  
Surplus	  (%)	  
Sellers'	  
Surplus	  (%)	  
1	   45	   13	   338	   169	   169	   50	   50	  
2	   43	   12	   288	   144	   144	   50	   50	  
3	   47	   12	   288	   144	   144	   50	   50	  
4	   41	   11	   242	   121	   121	   50	   50	  
5	   49	   11	   242	   121	   121	   50	   50	  
6	   43	   12	   288	   144	   144	   50	   50	  
7	   47	   12	   288	   144	   144	   50	   50	  
8	   41	   11	   242	   121	   121	   50	   50	  
9	   49	   11	   242	   121	   121	   50	   50	  
 
Table 6: Theoretical values from Session 5 
Treatment	  
Theoretical	  Values	  
Equilibrium	  
Price	  	  
Equilibrium	  
Quantity	  
Equilibrium	  
Surplus	  
Buyers'	  
Surplus	  
Sellers'	  
Surplus	  
Buyers'	  
Surplus	  (%)	  
Sellers'	  
Surplus	  (%)	  
1	   45	   8	   128	   64	   64	   50	   50	  
2	   43	   7	   98	   49	   49	   50	   50	  
3	   47	   7	   98	   49	   49	   50	   50	  
4	   41	   6	   72	   36	   36	   50	   50	  
5	   49	   6	   72	   36	   36	   50	   50	  
6	   43	   7	   98	   49	   49	   50	   50	  
7	   47	   7	   98	   49	   49	   50	   50	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8	   41	   6	   72	   36	   36	   50	   50	  
9	   49	   6	   72	   36	   36	   50	   50	  
 
Table 7: Theoretical values from Session 6 
Treatment	  
Theoretical	  Values	  
Equilibrium	  
Price	  	  
Equilibrium	  
Quantity	  
Equilibrium	  
Surplus	  
Buyers'	  
Surplus	  
Sellers'	  
Surplus	  
Buyers'	  
Surplus	  (%)	  
Sellers'	  
Surplus	  (%)	  
1	   45	   8	   128	   64	   64	   50	   50	  
2	   43	   7	   98	   49	   49	   50	   50	  
3	   47	   7	   98	   49	   49	   50	   50	  
4	   41	   6	   72	   36	   36	   50	   50	  
5	   49	   6	   72	   36	   36	   50	   50	  
6	   43	   7	   98	   49	   49	   50	   50	  
7	   47	   7	   98	   49	   49	   50	   50	  
8	   41	   6	   72	   36	   36	   50	   50	  
9	   49	   6	   72	   36	   36	   50	   50	  
 
 
Table 8: Experimental values from Session 1 
Treatment	  
Experimental	  Values	  
Equilibrium	  
Price*	  
Equilibrium	  
Quantity**	  
Equilibrium	  
Surplus	  ***	  
Buyers'	  
Surplus	  
Sellers'	  
Surplus	  
Buyers'	  
Surplus	  (%)	  
Sellers'	  
Surplus	  (%)	  
1	   45	   11	   240	   137	   103	   57	   43	  
2	   43	   11	   194	   102	   92	   52	   48	  
3	   43	   10	   192	   125	   67	   65	   35	  
4	   42	   9	   157	   65	   92	   41	   59	  
5	   47	   10	   152	   99	   53	   65	   35	  
6	   43	   10	   198	   113	   85	   57	   43	  
7	   44	   10	   191	   123	   68	   64	   36	  
8	   42	   10	   153	   69	   84	   45	   55	  
9	   46	   9	   151	   94	   57	   62	   38	  
 *median equilibrium price **median equilibrium quantity ***average equilibrium surplus 
 
Table 9: Experimental values from Session 2 
Treatment	  
Experimental	  Values	  
Equilibrium	  
Price*	  
Equilibrium	  
Quantity**	  
Equilibrium	  
Surplus***	  
Buyers'	  
Surplus	  
Sellers'	  
Surplus	  
Buyers'	  
Surplus	  (%)	  
Sellers'	  
Surplus	  (%)	  
1	   45	   8	   124	   61	   62	   49	   50	  
2	   44	   7	   95	   39	   56	   41	   59	  
3	   46	   7	   95	   51	   44	   54	   46	  
4	   48,5	   6	   70	   38	   32	   54	   46	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5	   43	   6	   69	   25	   44	   36	   64	  
6	   44	   7	   91	   34	   57	   37	   63	  
7	   47	   7	   90	   46	   44	   51	   49	  
8	   44	   7	   58	   10	   49	   17	   84	  
9	   47	   6	   62	   37	   25	   60	   40	  
 *median equilibrium price **median equilibrium quantity ***average equilibrium surplus 
 
Table 10: Experimental values from Session 3 
Treatment	  
Experimental	  Values	  
Equilibrium	  
Price*	  
Equilibrium	  
Quantity**	  
Equilibrium	  
Surplus***	  
Buyers'	  
Surplus	  
Sellers'	  
Surplus	  
Buyers'	  
Surplus	  (%)	  
Sellers'	  
Surplus	  (%)	  
1	   45	   8	   122	   56	   66	   46	   54	  
2	   42	   7	   91	   46	   45	   51	   49	  
3	   45	   7	   92	   54	   38	   59	   41	  
4	   42	   6	   71	   29	   41	   41	   58	  
5	   49	   6	   68	   39	   29	   57	   43	  
6	   44	   7	   97	   39	   58	   40	   60	  
7	   46	   7	   95	   58	   38	   61	   40	  
8	   43	   6	   68	   23	   45	   34	   66	  
9	   48	   7	   65	   42	   22	   65	   34	  
 *median equilibrium price **median equilibrium quantity ***average equilibrium surplus 
Table 11: Experimental values from Session 4 
Treatment	  
Experimental	  Values	  
Equilibrium	  
Price*	  
Equilibrium	  
Quantity**	  
Equilibrium	  
Surplus***	  
Buyers'	  
Surplus	  
Sellers'	  
Surplus	  
Buyers'	  
Surplus	  (%)	  
Sellers'	  
Surplus	  (%)	  
1	   44	   13	   320	   152	   169	   48	   53	  
2	   44	   13	   269	   114	   154	   42	   57	  
3	   45	   13	   276	   134	   142	   49	   51	  
4	   43	   12	   229	   99	   130	   43	   57	  
5	   46	   11	   232	   153	   79	   66	   34	  
6	   44	   13	   281	   153	   128	   54	   46	  
7	   45	   13	   274	   157	   117	   57	   43	  
8	   42	   12	   220	   90	   131	   41	   60	  
9	   46	   13	   220	   124	   96	   56	   44	  
 *median equilibrium price **median equilibrium quantity ***average equilibrium surplus 
 
Table 12: Experimental values from Session 5 
Treatment	  
Experimental	  Values	  
Equilibrium	  
Price*	  
Equilibrium	  
Quantity**	  
Equilibrium	  
Surplus***	  
Buyers'	  
Surplus	  
Sellers'	  
Surplus	  
Buyers'	  
Surplus	  (%)	  
Sellers'	  
Surplus	  (%)	  
1	   45	   8	   120	   58	   62	   48	   52	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2	   43	   6	   91	   45	   46	   49	   51	  
3	   45	   7	   86	   53	   33	   62	   38	  
4	   42	   5	   63	   28	   34	   44	   54	  
5	   46	   4	   52	   34	   18	   65	   35	  
6	   43	   7	   87	   35	   52	   40	   60	  
7	   44	   5	   81	   54	   27	   67	   33	  
8	   42	   6	   62	   24	   38	   39	   61	  
9	   48	   5	   62	   37	   25	   60	   40	  
 *median equilibrium price **median equilibrium quantity ***average equilibrium surplus 
 
Table 13: Experimental values from Session 6 
Treatment	  
Experimental	  Values	  
Equilibrium	  
Price*	  
Equilibrium	  
Quantity**	  
Equilibrium	  
Surplus***	  
Buyers'	  
Surplus	  
Sellers'	  
Surplus	  
Buyers'	  
Surplus	  (%)	  
Sellers'	  
Surplus	  (%)	  
1	   45	   8	   124	   66	   58	   53	   47	  
2	   43	   7	   95	   45	   50	   47	   53	  
3	   46	   7	   93	   50	   43	   54	   46	  
4	   42	   6	   67	   27	   40	   40	   60	  
5	   48	   5	   63	   37	   25	   59	   40	  
6	   44	   7	   96	   44	   53	   46	   55	  
7	   46	   7	   94	   51	   43	   54	   46	  
8	   41	   6	   65	   28	   37	   43	   57	  
9	   48	   6	   66	   40	   27	   61	   41	  
 *median equilibrium price **median equilibrium quantity ***average equilibrium surplus 
Table 14: Mann-Whitney test results for STB4-NSTB4 comparison 
 
 averagetradeprice 
Mann-Whitney U 873,000 
Wilcoxon W 1776,000 
Z -,081 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,936 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) ,938 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) ,469 
Point Probability ,002 
 
 
 
 
Table 15: Mann-Whitney test results for STS4-NSTS4 comparison 
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 averagetradeprice 
Mann-Whitney U 779,000 
Wilcoxon W 1682,000 
Z -,922 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,357 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) ,360 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) ,180 
Point Probability ,001 
 
 
 
 
Table 16: Mann-Whiney test results for STB8-NSTB8 comparison 
 
 averagetradeprice 
Mann-Whitney U 808,000 
Wilcoxon W 1711,000 
Z -,662 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,508 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) ,511 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) ,256 
Point Probability ,001 
 
 
 
Table 17: Mann-Whitney test results for STS8-NSTS8 comparison 
 
 averagetradeprice 
Mann-Whitney U 497,500 
Wilcoxon W 1400,500 
Z -3,440 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,001 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) ,000 
Point Probability ,000 
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 averagetradeprice 
Mann-Whitney U 497,500 
Wilcoxon W 1400,500 
Z -3,440 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,001 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) ,000 
Point Probability ,000 
 
 
 
Table 18: Mann-Whitney test results for STB4-STS4 comparison 
 averagetradeprice 
Mann-Whitney U 143,000 
Wilcoxon W 1046,000 
Z -6,613 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) ,000 
Point Probability ,000 
 
 
 
Table 19: Mann-Whitney test results for STB8-STS8 comparison 
 
 averagetradeprice 
Mann-Whitney U 512,000 
Wilcoxon W 1415,000 
Z -3,311 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,001 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) ,001 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) ,000 
Point Probability ,000 
 
Table 20: Mann-Whitney test results for NSTB4-NSTS4 
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 averagetradeprice 
Mann-Whitney U 275,000 
Wilcoxon W 1178,000 
Z -5,433 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) ,000 
Point Probability ,000 
 
 
Table 21: Mann-Whitney test results for NSTB8-NSTS8 comparison 
 
 Averagetradeprice 
Mann-Whitney U 1,000 
Wilcoxon W 904,000 
Z -7,882 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 
Exact Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) ,000 
Point Probability ,000 
 
 
 
 
	  
 
 
